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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the influence of political risk on firms in the tourism industry. It addresses a 
research gap regarding the impact of political risk on firm-level performance and failure, and 
uncovers the role of organizational slack in this relationship. Firm-level political risk is estimated 
from 2002–2019 financial data for firms across six tourism sectors in a developed economy, the 
USA. Such risk is found to be significantly associated with firm performance and business 
failure. From the perspectives of the resource-based view and the threat-rigidity hypothesis, the 
results support the moderating effects of absorbed and unabsorbed slack on links between risk, 
performance, and business failure. Given that the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the 
tourism industry’s vulnerability, this study will be of interest to tourism firms seeking to improve 
business sustainability and resilience. 
 









Substantial research has found that firms try to avoid investing in areas exposed to significantly 
disadvantageous political factors (Demiralay and Kilincarslan 2019; Holburn and Zelner 2010). 
Adverse political action, such as governmental authorities’ discriminatory changes to legislation, 
regulations, and investment terms, increases the risk that firms’ ability to utilize their assets and 
generate returns may be constrained, thus eroding their performance (Butler and Joaquin 1998). 
The USA, which is the research context for this study, has been ranked the third most visited 
destination by international tourist arrivals (UNWTO 2019), demonstrating its important role in 
generating global tourism-related business. Recent events, such as the trade “war” between the 
US and China, have raised concerns about the risks posed by the political system. This “war” has 
led to devaluation of China’s currency against the US dollar, making it more expensive for 
Chinese tourists to travel to the US. Domestically, in a terrorist incident in El Paso, Texas in 
August 2019, a gunman targeting Mexicans shot 22 dead and injured more than 20 (BBC News 
2019a). Some governments have warned their citizens not to travel to the US because of recent 
domestic terrorist incidents. In fact, in view of uncertainties arising from recent political events, 
American tourism firms may be facing more political risk than ever. 
Political risks have a critical influence on many aspects of firms’ behaviors, including loss 
of employment and tourist income, and business failure. For example, Hong Kong, one of the 
most famous tourism destinations in the world, has been badly affected by protests and city-wide 
strikes, and more than 200 flights were cancelled on 5 August 2019, with a significant fall-off in 
bookings, particularly in Hong Kong’s hospitality and tourism sectors (BBC News 2019b). 
Tourism-related businesses are vulnerable to instability from political and economic forces 
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(Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow 1999). Empirical evidence reveals that political risk has 
severe financial consequences for companies, including reducing corporate investment and 
increasing the costs of finance (Bradley, Pantzalis, and Yuan 2016; Julio and Yook 2012; 
Waisman, Ye, and Zhu 2015). Companies may cultivate connections with powerful politicians to 
manage political risk (Fisman 2001). Some have more bargaining power than others, depending 
on their size, ownership, and relationships with local government (Moon and Lado 2000). 
Acemoglu et al. (2016) find that companies are more likely to make political donations if returns 
on their companies’ shares are sensitive to political uncertainty, which explains why firms in the 
tourism sector are amongst the top contributors. Tourism companies have been actively 
managing political risk. Therefore, aggregate or sector-level measurements of political risk, 
which have been widely adopted in previous studies, may be not that precise to draw conclusions 
for the relationship between political risk and companies’ performance. Hassan et al. (2019) have 
developed a new measurement of firm-level political risk to investigate the impact of political 
risk on US listed firms. Their results indicate that most variation in political risk occurs at the 
corporate level rather than at the sector level or across the economy as a whole. 
Previous studies (e.g. Madanoglu and Ozdemir 2018; Saha and Yap 2014; Yang and Cai 
2016) have leveraged macropolitical and macroeconomic data to estimate variations in firm-level 
performance. For example, Saha and Yap’s (2014) study of 139 countries identifies the 
devastating impact of political instability and terrorism on tourism development. Existing 
literature on the impact of political risk and uncertainty on tourism focuses only on the national 
level. Regime types have been often used as an indicator of political risk, but according to Barry 
(2016), because service industries are generally more sensitive to such risk than extractive 




This study focuses on firm-level political risk and its potential impact on tourism firms, 
about which little is as yet known. Three perspectives motivate this study. First, from the 
resource-based view of the firm (Bonardi 2011), the impact of political risk on firm performance 
is likely to differ between firms, as their resources differ and they implement different business 
strategies in response to external shocks such as trade wars and pandemics. Second, since 
political instability negatively affects tourist arrivals and revenues (Saha and Yap, 2014), 
tourism-related businesses may be more vulnerable to the resulting risks, which may have more 
profound effects than firm performance on business failure. Third, Voss et al. (2008) argue that 
absorbed and unabsorbed slack resources are important for firms’ product exploration and 
exploitation in the face of environmental threats. Existing tourism literature (e.g., Demiralay and 
Kilincarslan 2019; Liu and Pratt 2017; Saha and Yap 2014) emphasizes the negative impact of 
political risk on tourist arrivals, tourism income, and tourism industry development, but fails to 
examine how individual tourism firms can ensure business sustainability and minimize negative 
impacts. Nohria and Gulati (1996) define slack as firms’ available resources beyond the level 
necessary to meet immediate business requirements. Therefore, this study investigates the role of 
organizational slack in mitigating the impact of political risk on tourism firms, as a moderator of 
the relationship between political risk and firm performance, and business failure. 
This study contributes to three strands of literature. First, although the impact of political 
risk on tourism has been extensively investigated (Demiralay and Kilincarslan 2019; Liu and 
Pratt 2017; Saha and Yap 2014), little light has been shed on firm-level variations. Emerging 
examples in the business world illustrate that political risk is largely a firm-specific phenomenon 
(Darby et al. 2020; Gad et al. 2020; Hassan et al. 2019), requiring firm-level rather than macro-
level research. This study is believed to be the first in the tourism domain to reveal the effect of 
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firm-level political risk on business performance and failure. Second, this study provides 
important evidence on how organizational slack influences the link between political risk and 
performance. As the tourism industry has become more vulnerable during the COVID-19 
pandemic, the role of organizational slack in dealing with external shocks has become even more 
important. The findings of this study will thus be beneficial to scholars, industry practitioners 
and policymakers seeking to improve business sustainability and resilience in the tourism sector. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Impact of Political Risk on Tourism 
Risk can be viewed as a combination of the possibility that an incident will happen, and its 
possible outcomes (Khattab, Anchor, and Davies 2007). Khattab et al. (2007) identify that most 
firms engaging in international business face political, financial, cultural, and natural risks. 
Political risk strongly influences the performance of firms’ foreign investments, leading to 
reduced investment expenditure (Julio and Yook 2012). The term “political risk” is often used to 
describe a broad context covering both societal and legal risks (Khattab et al. 2007). Political 
risks are classified as emanating from either the host government (including expropriation, 
currency inconvertibility, restrictions on taxes, imports, and exports), the host society (including 
terrorism, revolutions, and demonstrations), or interstate (including wars and economic 
sanctions). Political risk is recognized as having a significant influence on firms’ decisions, and 
in turn their performance. Strategic responses to political risk are determined by firms’ 
organizational capability to assess that risk and to manage the policymaking process. 
Organizational capabilities associated with managing political risk, referred to as “political 
capabilities” (Henisz and Zelner 2005; Holburn and Zelner 2010), refer to how firms deploy or 
utilize their political resources effectively to develop ties and coalitions, such as lobbying 
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government officials to maintain or introduce appropriate policies. A firm’s political risk thus 
differs according to its political capability. 
 
Unlike other types of business, tourism-related businesses and activities are discretionary in 
nature: no matter how attractive a destination and how cheap a trip or hotel, tourists will stop 
visiting if they perceive significant travel barriers such as visa restrictions, or insecurity arising 
from political uncertainty (Cothran and Cothran 1998). Therefore, the supply side of the tourism 
industry is highly susceptible to political dynamics, political risk, and maladministration (Saha 
and Yap 2014). Political risk may also arise from wars, terrorist acts, or intergovernmental 
tensions that interfere with peaceful international relations (Julio and Yook 2012). The tourism 
industry is extremely vulnerable to external factors such as political risk and health crises 
(Corbet et al. 2019; Kim and Marcouiller 2015; Ritchie and Jiang 2019). For example, the 9/11 
attacks in 2001 had a huge economic impact on American inbound tourism. At the firm level, 
hotels and casinos, as two major forms of tourism investment, are particularly vulnerable to 
political risk owing to their massive fixed assets (Cothran and Cothran 1998; Jang and Tang 
2009). 
The complexity of tourist experiences, the discretionary nature of tourism spending, and the 
impossibility of storing unsold tickets and unoccupied hotel rooms make tourism firms highly 
vulnerable to unsystematic exogenous risks such as political crises (Williams and Baláž 2015). 
This is attributable to most firms’ lack of control over the travel experience, which is shaped by 
various external events (Williams and Baláž 2015). Tourism firms usually find it difficult to 
protect their service innovations from competitors, while external factors limit their ability to 
seek and secure resources (Saha and Yap 2014). It is essential for tourism companies to manage 
specific firm-level factors in the face of various risks. Lee and Jang (2007) assert that size and 
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debt leverage are positively associated with systematic risk, while profitability and growth are 
negatively associated. Therefore, there is variation in how different tourism firms are influenced 
by risks, including political risk. Tourism firms with available resources and capabilities tend to 
seek ways to manage risks by acquiring and utilizing knowledge, diversifying, and acquiring 
resources (Williams and Baláž 2015). 
Athari et al. (2020) indicate that tourism activities and the number of tourists increase 
significantly in countries with low levels of political risk. Therefore, policies to reduce political 
risk are effective in advancing the development of the tourism industry (Faber and Gaubert 
2019). In the tourism literature, studies focus mainly on the relationship between terrorism and 
tourism (e.g. Demiralay and Kilincarslan 2019; Liu and Pratt 2017; Lanouar and Goaied 2019), 
and on the association between tourism demand and policy-related economic uncertainty 
(Köseoglu et al. 2013; Madanoglu and Ozdemir 2018). For example, Demiralay and Kilincarslan 
(2019) find that tourism firms’ stock returns are very sensitive to geopolitical risk, while 
Madanoglu and Ozdemir (2018) find that hotels’ operating performance is negatively associated 
with policy-related economic uncertainty, using measures such as average room rate, occupancy, 
and revenue per available room. Although the macro impact of political risk on tourism firms’ 
performance has been investigated, differences in the extent of political risk faced by individual 
firms have generally been neglected. It is more meaningful to examine the impact of political 
risk at the firm level, rather than merely considering the macro impact of political uncertainty, 





Firm-Level Political Risk and Firm Performance 
Both macro and micro aspects of political risk have major negative effects on business. Macro 
factors have similar effects on all companies in a country or region, whereas micro factors affect 
specific industries or firms (Alon and Herbert 2009). For instance, macropolitical risks include 
potential changes to monetary policies that may influence a country or region’s currency and 
taxation, as well as trade policies (Alon et al. 2006). Micropolitical risk is much more relevant 
and specific to some sectors or firms than macropolitical risk, yet there is little literature on the 
extent of its impact (Alon and Herber 2009). 
Micropolitical risks do not affect all businesses. In the tourism sector, they are often 
associated with tourism-related policy changes, such as travel visa requirements, tourism taxes, 
and funding for national parks and historical sites (Alon et al. 2006). Micro- and macropolitical 
risks are not entirely separate, with common factors including the governmental, social, and 
economic environments (Alon et al. 2006). Micropolitical risk assessments are undertaken when 
adjusting macropolitical risk ratings (Alon and Herbert 2009). For example, Alon and Herbert’s 
(2009) risk assessment model includes economic-, social- and government-related political 
influences emanating from both within and outside a country, as well as firm-related factors. As 
tourism practitioners tend to focus on changes that may particularly affect their own firms, the 
impact of micropolitical risks on tourism firms deserves more research attention. The impact of 
political risk must also be considered within the framework of firm-specific characteristics, as 
political risk varies across firms (Khattab et al. 2007). 
In the US market, firms’ differing political capabilities play a key role in firm performance. 
Firms’ ties with political leaders or parties may provide a critical competitive advantage. US 
firms create and fund political action committees (PACs) that campaign and raise funds for 
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specific issues or candidates. PAC contributions may enhance firms’ performance by giving 
them access to key officials, enabling them to influence the legislative process for their own 
benefit (Brown 2016). Bonardi et al. (2006) find that having experience of dealing with 
government agencies positively affects firms’ returns. Firms widely recognize making donations 
to political campaigns and lobbying politicians as ways to manage political risk. Large firms may 
gain more than medium and small firms from swaying political decisions (Hassan et al. 2019).  
Hassan et al.’s (2019) textual analysis of firms’ conference calls, capturing management’s 
views on firms’ exposure to political risks, reveals that increased firm-level political risk makes 
firms’ stock returns significantly more volatile, and leads to decreased capital expenditure and 
hiring. Affected firms may find it more difficult to maintain profits and performance. Although 
evidence remains scarce on the effect of firm-level political risks on tourism organizations, based 
on previous literature on micropolitical risk, firm-specific capabilities, and recent research 
findings on firm-level political risk from Hassan et al. (2019), we hypothesize that:  
H1: Firm-level political risk is negatively associated with tourism firms’ performance. 
Firm-Level Political Risk and Business Failure 
Business failure has been explored in many developed and undeveloped economies (e.g., Mellahi 
and Wilkinson 2004). Park and Hancer (2012) define business failure as a situation in which a 
company’s financial reservoir fails to meet its payment obligations. Although bankruptcy clearly 
signals a firm’s demise, it presents only a partial picture of the failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson 
2004). Altman’s (1968) model aims to predict organizational bankruptcy by measuring leading 
sources of business failure. Other indicators of business failure have since been identified, 
including negative profitability (D’Aveni 1989), withdrawal from international markets 
(Jackson, Mellahi, and Sparks 2005), and loss of market share (Mellahi, Jackson, and Sparks 
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2002). Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) observe that technological, regulatory, economic, and 
demographic changes generally create waves of business failure. Governance failures are 
ascribed to institutional and political factors, which in turn induce business failure. Copious 
studies verify that various external factors may lead to business failure (Zhang, Amankwah-
Amoah, and Beaverstock 2019). For example, Karabag (2019) identifies political risk and 
national technological policy changes as the main factors contributing to Turkish firms’ failure. 
Two main streams of literature use either deterministic or voluntaristic theoretical 
frameworks to investigate factors influencing business failure (Zhang et al. 2019). From the 
deterministic perspective, external factors give rise to failures owing to managers’ limited 
control over their business environment (Karabag 2019). Institutional factors such as economic 
regimes and political risk are generally considered to be deterministic (Melahi and Wilkinson 
2004). Empirical studies have examined the effect of political instability on direct investment in 
foreign countries (Touny 2016) and tourism (Sivesan 2017), but few have investigated the effect 
of firm-level political risk on tourism-related business failures. 
External turbulence such as political risk may cause changes to interest rates and sharp 
declines in real-estate values. Such crises place tourism firms at risk of business failure, given 
their capital-intensive and highly-geared nature, as a large proportion of these firms’ capital 
expenditure is funded from long-term debt financing using property as collateral (Park and 
Hancer 2012). The tourism industry’s close ties with the economic climate expose it to financial 
distress. Its vulnerability to unsystematic exogenous risks (Saha and Yap 2014; Williams and 
Baláž 2015), such as natural and sociopolitical disasters, requires managers to assess and manage 
risk at the firm level. Tourism companies have differing abilities to obtain the required returns 
and cash flows to meet their obligations and avoid business failure under the force of exogenous 
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political risk. The negative effects of political risk also differ, as they are absorbed by firm-
specific capabilities (Park and Hancer 2012). Tourism companies must be able to hedge their 
debt financing risks resulting from political risk in order to strengthen their financial position and 
avoid business failure. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firm-level political risk is positively associated with the likelihood of firms’ business 
failure. 
Moderating Effect of Organizational Slack 
Cyert and March (1963) describe how organizations make decisions. An important implication 
of behavioral theory for business organizations is that firms with stronger financial performance 
have lower organizational downside risks, and that poor financial performance increases these 
risks. In this theory, the concept of “slack” is defined as bundles of potential or available 
resources that an organization can freely deploy to adapt to changes (Staber and Sydow 2002). 
Voss et al. (2008) define financial slack as financial resources in excess of those required for the 
organization to operate. Financial slack increases organizations’ resilience to external shocks, 
such as uncertainties regarding changes to economic policies (Rafailov 2017). It serves as a 
buffer against the external environment, and protects organizations from negative impacts on 
their performance (Rafailov 2017). Martinez and Artz (2006) argue that maintaining slack 
provides a resource cushion enabling managers to weather unexpected external changes. 
Singh (1986) categorizes organizational slack into unabsorbed and absorbed slack. The 
former refers to available resources, such as uncommitted liquid assets, that can be freely used to 
meet current liabilities, while the latter relates to salaries, administrative costs, and other 
expenses (Wefald et al. 2010). Firms that maintain a good level of absorbed slack experience 
lower employee turnover, as staff are less likely to be required to work extra hours when a firm 
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encounters changes to customer demand (Singh 1986). Xu et al. (2015) explain that absorbed 
slack includes generic resources that are usually employed for a specific purpose and are less 
easily redeployed, whereas unabsorbed slack, with a low level of absorption, includes resources 
that can be easily redeployed within the organization. Excess resources in unabsorbed slack are 
often used to help firms’ R&D, new market entry, and implementation of new strategies (Xu et 
al. 2015). 
Argilés-Bosch et al. (2018) distinguish between absorbed and unabsorbed slack in terms of 
their resource constraints. Constrained resources contribute largely to absorbed slack. These 
include finished and manufactured products, which are constrained due to their limited 
discretionary usage, and other examples include machines and equipment (Argilés-Bosch et al. 
2018). In tourism firms, some pre-booked tours and charter flights offer less discretion for 
resource redeployment, while financial resources such as cumulative earnings from previous 
operations, as a typical example of unabsorbed slack, can be readily redeployed to meet new 
demands (Tabesh, Vera, and Keller 2019). 
From the resource-based view, an appropriate combination of organizational resources, in 
the form of financial, physical, political, human, organizational, or informational resources, 
should promote firm performance and efficiency (Zhang et al. 2018). Financial slack can be 
deployed for various uses (Mishina, Pollock, and Porac 2004). From the perspective of resource 
redeployment, executive operators need slack resources for expansion and innovation (Daniel et 
al. 2004). Unabsorbed slack, in the form of bundles of unconstrained resources, increases 
exploration and facilitates resource redeployment and synergies (Argilés-Bosch et al. 2018; 
Tabesh et al. 2019). Uncommitted resources within a firm’s unabsorbed slack can easily be 
redeployed and used more flexibly, with discretion for new strategies to adapt to external policy 
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changes (Lee, Liu, and Yu 2021). Unabsorbed slack helps firms in turbulent business 
environments not only to tackle uncertainties, including political risk, but also to achieve goals 
under institutional pressures (Xu et al. 2015). With more unabsorbed slack, firms find it easier to 
allocate resources to mitigate the negative influences of political risk on their performance, and 
tend to suffer less from financial distress and bankruptcy (Hadlock and James 2002). 
Absorbed slack may offset intermediate organizational risk (Wefald et al. 2010), providing a 
buffer to reduce coordination costs, improve economies of scope, and resolve resource conflicts. 
Xu et al. (2015) claim that absorbed slack may reduce costs and make resource allocation and 
utilization more efficient. From the perspective of the threat-rigidity hypothesis, in threatening 
situations, firms may be less likely to engage in high risk-taking behavior, and more likely to 
take strong control, conserve resources, and focus on essential activities (Sarkar and Osiyevskyy 
2018). Resources committed to specific tasks within a firm’s absorbed slack may serve as a 
buffer, because the less discretionary nature of organizational slack limits its function, forcing 
top management to concentrate solely on existing strategies and manage workflow operations 
(Lee et al. 2021). Teirlinck (2020) argue that absorbed slack may help firms to create long-term 
competitive advantage, for example through investment in technological development and 
education and training. The more absorbed resources a firm has, the more likely it will be to 
concentrate on implementing strategic activities (Lee et al. 2021). 
In summary, from the resource-based view and in relation to the concept of resource 
deployment, unabsorbed slack with unconstrained resources can be redeployed for various uses 
to mitigate the impact of political risk on firm performance. From the perspective of the threat-
rigidity hypothesis, absorbed slack with constrained resources may help firms to focus on 
essential activities, may have a buffering effect on normal business operations in a threatening 
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environment, and may contribute to long-term competitive advantage. Based on this mechanism, 
both types of slack may moderate associations between firm-level political risk and firm 
performance, as well as organizational failure risk (measured by bankruptcy risk). Extant studies 
of the association between slack and firm performance are inconclusive (e.g. Daniel et al. 2004; 
Wefald et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2015). Few studies investigate slack as a moderator of the effects of 
political risk on firm performance and organizational failure. Based on these arguments, we 
therefore hypothesize that: 
H3a: Absorbed and unabsorbed slack have moderating effects on the link between political risk 
and firm performance. 
H3b: Absorbed and unabsorbed slack have moderating effects on the link between political risk 
and business failure. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data 
To examine the impact of firm-level political risk on American tourism firms’ performance, we 
included six sub-sectors in our sample to gain a broad picture of the tourism industry (see Table 
2). Data were drawn from various sources. Accounting information, including financial 
performance measures, were obtained from the Bloomberg database, and Hassan et al.’s (2019) 
measure of firm-level political risk was retrieved from an online source 
(https://www.policyuncertainty.com/firm_pr.html). Table 1 presents the sample selection criteria. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The primary sample included all publicly listed American firms in the tourism and leisure 
industry according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), from 2002 to 2019, resulting 
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in 5,036 firm-year observations and 629 unique firms. In order to deal with survival bias, we 
allowed firms to exit and enter the US listed market. Merging the data on political risk resulted in 
an unbalanced panel dataset of 2,817 firm-year observations, representing 290 unique tourism 
and leisure firms over the period 2002 to 2019. Our sample period ended at 2019 because this 
was the latest year for which political risk information was available. Table 2 provides 
information across the years of analysis on the distribution of firms for six sub-sectors of the 
tourism and leisure industry: travel & tourism, airlines, recreational & services, hotels, 
restaurants & bars, and gambling. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Dependent Variables 
Both accounting- and market-based performance measures were employed as dependent 
variables in this study. Return on assets (ROA), a commonly used accounting ratio, has been 
widely applied in previous studies to measure tourism firms’ performance (e.g., Kang and Lee 
2014; Zheng and Tsai 2019). Another frequently used accounting ratio is return on equity (ROE), 
which reflects a firm’s ability to gain from its employed capital (Moon and Sharma 2014). To 
increase the robustness of this research, we used Tobin’s Q as a proxy, calculated as the total 
market capitalization divided by the total book value of equity, which is a market-based 
performance measure also commonly used to measure tourism firms’ performance because it is 
closely associated with firms’ stock-related performance (Chen, Hou, and Lee 2012). In 
summary, three performance measures—Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE—were used in this study. 
Lastly, the Altman’s (1968) measure of bankruptcy risk was used in this study, applying a 
multiple discriminant model, the Altman z-score, to measure firms’ bankruptcy risk. The Altman 
z-score has been widely used to measure bankruptcy risk and was employed in this study as a 
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dependent variable to measure organizational failure risk (Altman, 1968; Altman et al. 2017). 





















Firm-level political risk was the main independent variable used in this study. This is measured 
on a quarterly basis, capturing political topics disclosed in conference calls by firms’ 
management (Hassan et al. 2019). Figure 1 shows changes in the mean of firm-level political risk 
retrieved from Hassan et al. (2019) for the US tourism industry between 2002 and 2019. This 
presents a picture of important political events in the US. For example, the line chart peaks in 
2003 in response to the invasion of Iraq, with another peak around 2006 in response to the 
transatlantic aircraft plot. Thus, the mean political risk for the US tourism and leisure industry 
was expected to be high around such important political events. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Measure of Firm-Level Political Risk 
This study adopted the firm-level political risk index developed by Hassan et al. (2019), who 
conducted a textual analysis based on transcripts of US listed firms’ quarterly earnings 
conference calls. This pioneering firm-level measure of political risk allows a firm’s political risk 
to be quantified at specific points in time, based on documented conversations in conference 
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calls focusing primarily on general political risk. To discern language relating to non-political 
and political matters, a pattern-based sequence-classification method was used (Hassan et al. 
2019). As an overall measure of political risk exposure, a training library of political texts 
(including textbooks on American politics and political sections of US newspaper articles) and a 
training library of non-political texts (articles from non-political sections of US newspapers) 
were compiled to identify word combinations frequently used in the documentary evidence. To 
measure specific political risks, training libraries were developed from texts on eight political 
topics to identify word patterns often used to discuss particular political topics (Hassan et al. 
2019). 
Firms’ overall risk was captured from data from conference calls dealing with risk and 
uncertainty issues (Hassan et al. 2019). Using the textual analysis method, Hassan et al. (2019) 
developed a set of measures to capture the specific effect of political risks encountered by 
individual firms. They measured firm-level political risk by disaggregating each firm i’s 
conference-call transcript in quarter t into a list of bigrams included in transcript b (Hassan et al. 
2019). They counted the frequency of occurrences of bigrams reflecting a particular political 
issue in a group of 10 words with meanings similar to “risk” or “uncertainty,” and then divided 
this by the total frequency of bigrams (details for the process can be found via Appendix 3 in 
Hassan et al. 2019): 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =
∑𝑏







where 𝟙[…] is the indicator function, and r refers to the position of the nearest synonym for 
risk/uncertainty. ℙ\ℕ represents the group of bigrams included in ℙ but not ℕ, and 𝑓𝑏,ℙ is the 
frequency of bigram b in the training library. 𝐵𝕡 refers to the total number of bigrams in the 
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training library (Hassan et al. 2019). We adopted this measure of firm-level political risk as our 
main independent variable. 
Data on political risk are reported quarterly. Based on Darby et al. (2020), we calculated 
annual average political risk indices based on all four quarters’ firm-level political risk indices 
from Hassan et al. (2019). These measures should be interpreted as indicative of the risk 
perceived by firm managers and participants in their conference calls (Hassan et al. 2019). 
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Baker et al. 2016; Madanoglu and Ozdemir 2018) that have used 
an influential index of aggregate economic policy uncertainty through textual analysis of 
newspaper articles, Hassan et al.’s (2019) measure not only provides the first firm-level measure 
of political risk to allow a meaningful distinction between aggregate sector-level and firm level 
exposure, but also allows flexible decomposition into topic-specific components (Darby et al. 
2020). 
We used two measures to assess the moderating role of organizational slack: unabsorbed 
slack and absorbed slack. Following previous studies (Singh 1986; Xu et al. 2015), unabsorbed 
slack was measured by the ratio of cash reserves to total assets, which indicates financial slack at 
a firm level. Absorbed slack was calculated as the ratio of general expenses to total sales, 
adapted from Wefald et al. (2010). 
Control Variables 
The analysis also involved several control variables that might impact on firms’ financial 
performance. We controlled for the effects of firm size (SIZE), fixed assets ratio (FIX), leverage 
(LEV), growth in sales and assets (SG and AG) and liquidity ratio (LIQ). Firm size was measured 
by the logarithm of total assets (Kang and Lee 2014), and leverage was measured by total debt to 
total assets (Zheng and Tsai 2019). In tourism firms such as gambling firms, hotels, restaurants, 
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and airlines, value is normally created from fixed assets. Therefore, the fixed-assets ratio was 
used, calculated as a firm’s fixed assets divided by total assets (Zheng and Tsai 2019). Lazăr 
(2016) claims that growth in sales and assets are determinants of firms’ performance and stock 
performance. Sales growth (SG) was calculated as sales at time t minus sales at time t-1 divided 
by sales at time t-1. Assets growth (AG) was calculated as assets at time t minus assets at time t-1 
divided by assets at time t-1. The liquidity ratio (LIQ), measured as the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities, is positively associated with firm performance (Adams and Buckle 2003). The 
lower a firm’s liquidity, the higher the risk of bankruptcy (Mihalovic 2016). 
Model Estimations 
Three key panel data estimation models are commonly applied: pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS), fixed effects, and random effects (Asterriou and Hall 2016). First, to determine whether a 
fixed-effects or random-effects model would be the more appropriate estimation model for this 
study, a Hausman test was run. Second, an F-test was conducted to determine whether the fixed-
effects model was more efficient than the pooled OLS model. Fixed-effects models were 
predominantly selected based on the results of these tests. Fixed-effects models are advantageous 
in eliminating bias that may lead to correlations between panel-level disturbance and 
independent variables. They allow unobserved variables to be associated with observed variables 
(Asterriou and Hall 2016), and remove the impact of time-invariant characteristics to enable 
assessment of the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable (Asterriou and Hall 2016). 
A “robust” regression method was used to mitigate any heteroscedasticity. Equation (1) tests 
the impact of firm-level political risk on firm performance measures and bankruptcy risk, which 
relate to hypotheses 1 and 2. Equations (2) and (3) test the moderating effects of absorbed and 
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unabsorbed slack on relationships between firm-level political risk, firm performance, and 
business failure (measured by bankruptcy risk), which are associated with hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄, 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑧 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽µ𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡1   (1) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄, 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑧 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽µ𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡2     (2) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄, 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑧 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽µ𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡3     (3) 
where ROA is computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization at time 
t divided by total assets at time t; ROE is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization at time t divided by total equities at time t; Tobin’s Q is a proxy calculated as total 
market capitalization divided by the total book value of equity at time t; Altman z-score is 
calculated as 0.012 × working capital/total assets(%)i,t + 0.014 × retained earnings/total 
assets(%)i,t + 0.033 × earnings before interest and tax/total assets(%)i,t + 0.006 × market value 
equity/total debt(%)i,t + 0.999 × sales/total assets(%)i,t (Altman, 1968); PRISK is a firm-level 
political risk measure derived from textual analysis of firm-level conference-call transcripts 
centered around political issues; Unabsorbed slack is cash at time t divided by total assets at time 
t; Absorbed slack is general and administrative expenses at time t divided by total sales at time t; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at time t; FIX is fixed assets at time t divided by total 
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assets at time t; LEV is total liabilities at time t divided by total assets at time t; SG and AG are 
growth in sales and growth in assets; and LIQ is the ratio of current assets at time t to current 
liabilities at time t. Two interaction terms were added to equations (2) and (3): Unabsorbed slack 
and PRISK, and Absorbed Slack and PRISK. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables are shown in Table 3. The 
continuous variables were winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The means of the sample are 
0.024 for ROA, 0.057 for ROE, and 1.999 for Tobin’s Q, and the Altman z-score is 3.480. On 
average, the political risk score (PRISK) is 104.881, and the mean values of unabsorbed and 
absorbed slack are 0.099 and 0.118 respectively. The average logarithm of total assets (SIZE) is 
6.518, and the value of 0.638 for LEV suggests that total liabilities average over half of the total 
assets of the sample firms. The average fixed assets ratio (FIX) is 0.493, and the average growth 
rates for the sample firms’ sales and assets are 0.092 and 1.622, with an average liquidity ratio of 
1.527. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables are shown in Table 4. We note no high 
bivariate correlations among the variables, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in our 
models. The correlation matrix suggests that firm-level political risk is negatively correlated with 
all three financial performance measures and the business failure risk measure (Altman z-score). 
No significant correlation is found between either unabsorbed or absorbed organizational slack, 




[Insert Table 4 here] 
Impact of Firm-Level Political Risk on Firms’ Financial Performance 
Table 5 reports the fixed-effects panel regression analysis results for the effect of firm-level 
political risk on firms’ financial performance and business failure risk. The results of Hausman 
test (models 1 to 4) indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of the test, suggesting fixed effects 
estimation is consistent. Model (1) shows a significantly negative relationship between political 
risk (PRISK) and ROA (β = -0.008; p < 0.01), Model (2) reveals a significantly negative 
relationship between firm-level political risk (PRISK) and ROE (β = -0.005; p < 0.05), Model 
(3) presents a significantly negative relationship between political risk (PRISK) and Tobin’s Q (β 
= -0.001; p < 0.01), and Model (4) indicates a negative and significant relationship between 
political risk (PRISK) and Altman z score (β = -0.003; p < 0.01). The coefficients of PRISK 
indicate that if political risk increases by one standard deviation, tourism firms experience 
reductions of 0.8% and 0.5% in ROA (with a standard error, SE, of 0.003) and ROE (SE 0.009) 
respectively, a 0.1% decrease in Tobin’s Q, and a 0.3% decrease in Altman z-score (SE 0.001). 
Overall, the empirical results indicate that firms facing greater political risk are more likely to 
experience negative financial performance, supporting hypothesis 1. A negative impact of firm-
level political risk on the Altman z-score is also shown, indicating that greater firm-level 
political risk results in a lower Altman z-score, and thus an increased likelihood of bankruptcy. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Moderating Effect of Organizational Slack 
Table 6 presents the results of fixed-effects panel regression analysis including the effects of the 
moderating variables (unabsorbed and absorbed slack) on relationships between firm-level 
political risk, firm performance, and the Altman z-score. The results of Hausman test (models 5 
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to 12) indicated the rejection of null hypothesis of the test, suggesting fixed effects estimation is 
consistent. In models (5) and (6), the previously identified negative relationship between firm-
level political risk (PRISK) and ROA is moderated by unabsorbed and absorbed slack. 
Statistically significant interactions between Unabsorbed slack and PRISK (β = 0.0012; p < 
0.05), and between Absorbed slack and PRISK (β = 0.0011; p < 0.05) in models (5) and (6) 
suggest that the negative relationship between firm-level political risk and ROA is weaker in 
incorporating with unabsorbed or absorbed slacks. The positive moderating effects of 
unabsorbed and absorbed slack on the negative relationship between PRISK and Tobin’s Q are 
supported in models (9) and (10). Statistically significant interactions between Unabsorbed slack 
and PRISK (β = 0.0004; p < 0.01), and Absorbed slack and PRISK (β = 0.0008; p < 0.01) in 
models (9) and (10) suggest that the negative relationship between firm-level political risk and 
Tobin’s Q is weaker in incorporating with unabsorbed or absorbed slacks. Significant 
coefficients for the interactions between Unabsorbed slack and PRISK (β = 0.001; p < 0.01), 
and Absorbed slack and PRISK (β = 0.0012; p < 0.05) are found in models (11) and (12), which 
implies that the negative relationship between firm-level political risk and the Altman z-score is 
weaker in firms with unabsorbed or absorbed slacks. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b, Figure 2 visualizes the moderating effects of unabsorbed 
and absorbed slacks. These results suggest that higher levels of unabsorbed and absorbed slacks 
mitigate the negative impacts of firm-level political risk (PRISK) on ROA and Tobin’s Q. Figure 
2 also shows that firms with higher levels of unabsorbed and absorbed slacks tend to perform 
better in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q when suffering firm-level political risk. Firms with higher 
levels of unabsorbed and absorbed slacks also tend to be less affected by higher firm-level 
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political risk due to the fact that having a higher the Altman z-score indicates a less likelihood to 
have a distress and trouble in maintaining a good financial health. In contrast, firms with lower 
levels of unabsorbed and absorbed slacks tend to have lower Altman z-scores under the higher 
firm-level political risk, indicating a higher likelihood to have a financial distress and heightened 
risk of bankruptcy and business failure. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the impact of firm-level political risk on American tourism firms’ financial 
performance and business failure risk, and provides empirical support for negative relationships 
between these factors. It also empirically tests the moderating effects of unabsorbed and 
absorbed organizational slacks. 
The tourism industry is perceived to be greatly influenced by macro-environmental factors 
such as terrorism, economic conditions, and political uncertainty (Ritchie and Jiang 2019). The 
association between political risk and tourism has been widely studied from both national and 
international perspectives. Many studies have also examined the considerable effects of macro-
level political risk. This study fills a gap in extant studies of the effect of political risk and 
uncertainty. Several studies have investigated developing economies, such as China (Yang and 
Cai 2016) and Tunisia (Lanouar and Goaied 2019), with a few studies (e.g., Chang and Zeng 
2011; Madanoglu and Ozdmir 2018) in developed economies, but little research has been carried 
out on major developed economies such as the US, where political choices may affect the global 
macro outlook. This study is significant in exploring the impact of political risk on American 
tourism firms’ financial performance. The negative impact of firm-level political risk on firms’ 
financial performance is strongly supported, which is in line with the large effect of macro-level 
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political risk. Consistent with previous research (Julio and Yook 2012; Madanoglu and Ozdemir 
2018), the results of this study show that political risk has a negative impact on firms in six sub-
sectors of the American tourism industry. 
From the perspective of organizational behavior, Argilés-Bosch et al. (2018) argue that 
absorbed and unabsorbed slack may help firms to deal with external shocks, including political 
risk and uncertainty. Our results confirm the positive moderating effects of absorbed and 
unabsorbed slack on the identified negative link between firm-level political risk and firm 
performance. With regard to reducing the negative impact of firm-level political risk on the 
Altman z-score, absorbed and unabsorbed slack may help firms be more cost-efficient and 
overcome financial distress, in turn lowering the likelihood of bankruptcy (Hadlock and James 
2002). The results clearly demonstrate that firms with a higher levels of absorbed or unabsorbed 
slacks tend to be less affected under a higher firm-level political risk due to the fact that having a 
higher the Altman z-score indicates a less likelihood to have a distress and trouble in maintaining 
a good financial health. In line with Lee at al.’s (2021) suggestion that the impact of political risk 
varies with differences in firms’ strategic resources and capabilities, this study confirms that both 
uncommitted and committed resources within firms’ unabsorbed and absorbed slacks are critical 
in mitigating the negative impact of firm-level political risk. 
This is believed to be one of the first studies in the tourism context to focus on the impact of 
political risk from a firm-level perspective. It enriches the existing literature and sheds new light 
on the impact of firm-level political risk, business failure, and the moderating role of 
organizational slack in tourism. Applying the resource-based view of the firm and the concepts 
of resource deployment and organizational slack to the tourism business context also helps 
identify sources of competitive advantage and capabilities for dealing with risks in the tourism 
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industry. Tourism-related businesses are much more vulnerable to external shocks than other 
types of business (Madanoglu and Ozdemir 2018; Tsionas and Assaf 2014), and this study 
provides empirical evidence that organizational slack has a buffering effect on tourism firms’ 
vulnerability to political risk. Tourism firms are vulnerable to risk relating to banking and 
financial policies, as the tourism industry is one of the biggest borrowers of capital and must take 
precautions against influential political events (Madanoglu and Ozdemir 2018; Tsionas and 
Assaf 2014). 
The detailed insights of our findings for different performance measures reveal that the 
negative effect of firm-level political risk on tourism firms tends to be greater for accounting-
based performance measures (ROE and ROA) than for market-based performance measures 
(Tobin’s Q). This implies that these firms’ senior management should not prioritize market-
based performance measures, because these may be less sensitive to firm-level political risk. In 
other words, firm-level political risk may cause greater harm to firms’ free cash flows and 
profitability than to their market value, while potential financial distress will lead to increased 
borrowing during politically uncertain periods. Business failure risk deserves greater attention 
from senior management, who need to understand the roles of absorbed and unabsorbed slacks in 
dealing with external shocks, including political risk and uncertainty. 
The results of this study suggest that the mitigating effects of unabsorbed and absorbed 
slacks on the negative impact of political risk on firm accounting performance. The influences of 
unabsorbed and absorbed slacks should encourage tourism firms’ management to utilize different 
types of resource appropriately in their firms to deal with political risk. As unabsorbed slack 
includes unconstrained or uncommitted resources within a firm, tourism firm managers should 
consider redeploying these resources and increasing their discretionary utilization to mitigate the 
27 
 
negative impact of political risk. In addition to financial resources, which are a typical example 
of unconstrained resources, tourism firms should increasingly redeploy resources such as cash in 
marketable securities and short-term investments. Slack in customer relations has been identified 
as another type of unabsorbed slack (Voss et al., 2008), so focusing on committed customers 
who might provide tangible and foreseeable benefits might provide valuable support for firms in 
difficult times. Tourism firms in mass markets must value loyal customers and view them as an 
essential component in building unabsorbed slack. 
Additionally, absorbed slack has a slightly stronger mitigating effect than unabsorbed slack 
on the negative impact of political risk on the Altman z-score (business failure risk). These 
findings suggest changes to senior management’s financial activities and decision making. As 
absorbed slack is associated with constrained or committed resources that can be redeployed, 
tourism firms should focus on required and essential activities to lower the possibility of business 
failure. Firms with higher levels of absorbed slack should concentrate on resource utilization for 
long-term business planning. In a threatening environment, absorbed slack allows firms to focus 
on restricting losses and cutting costs, because committed resources are less discretionary in 
nature. Therefore, it is essential for tourism firms to evaluate whether committed/constrained 
resources might contribute to long-term business planning. Although the dataset for this study 
did not capture the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism businesses in the US, the 
results still provide some valuable insights into how tourism firms might deal with external 
shocks, by enhancing unabsorbed and absorbed slacks through increased redeployment and 
discretionary utilization of resources, concentration on required and essential business activities, 




This study has some limitations. We acknowledge that firm-level measures may not fully 
capture all firm-level political risk, and research on such measures is still developing (e.g., 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016; Hassan et al. 2019). Furthermore, owing to the limited 
availability of firm-level political data spanning the period 2002–2019, the results might be 
replicated using an updated data panel to study other business sectors. The results may have 
limited generalizability to private firms because of differences in their strategies for financial 
management and business planning. Future studies might examine the effect of firm-level 
political risk across different industries and countries, and other firm specific factors might also 
be investigated, such as the extent of business diversification and corporate governance. Since 
Hassan et al.’s (2019) new firm-level political risk index is publicly accessible, future research 
might also investigate how different types of corporate political activities are linked with actual 
political risk at a firm level, which in turn affects firm performance. 
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Table 1: Sample selection criteria 
Sample selection criteria Firm-year observations Unique firms 
Sample (1): American publicly listed tourism and leisure 
firms, 2002–2019 
5,036 629 
Sample (2): American publicly listed firms with available 
political risk information, 2002–2019 
318,412 12,252 
Merged data from samples (1) and (2): firms in the tourism 
and leisure industry with data available on accounting 














Table 2: Sample split by sub-sectors  






Tourism Grand Total 
2002 11 40 16 19 70 14 170 
2003 13 39 17 16 64 12 161 
2004 13 37 16 16 63 13 158 
2005 13 36 12 16 64 14 155 
2006 14 38 13 18 62 12 157 
2007 17 34 13 19 56 12 151 
2008 14 34 14 20 54 13 149 
2009 14 30 16 20 52 13 145 
2010 14 36 18 24 64 14 170 
2011 14 34 19 24 62 16 169 
2012 14 35 15 25 63 16 168 
2013 13 30 17 29 61 14 164 
2014 13 28 19 27 64 17 168 
2015 13 27 19 28 67 14 168 
2016 12 26 15 25 66 15 159 
2017 11 23 14 24 60 14 146 
2018 11 22 14 23 53 13 136 
2019 11 18 13 21 49 11 123 








Figure 1: The firm-level political risk of American tourism firms from 2002 to 2019 















Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables       Obs              Mean   Std. Dev.          Min             Max 
ROA 2,817 0.024 0.106 -0.469 0.294 
ROE 2,817 0.057 0.290 -1.19 1.247 
Tobin's Q 2,817 1.999 1.420 0.6290 9.053 
Altman Z-score 2,817 3.480 3.466 -3.663 20.048 
PRISK 2,817 104.881 132.872 5.313 835.741 
Unabsorbed Slack 2,817 0.099 0.110 0.002 0.611 
Absorbed Slack 2,817 0.118 0.100 0.005 0.519 
SIZE 2,817 6.518 1.963 2.233 10.654 
FIX 2,817 0.493 0.265 0.003 0.945 
LEV 2,817 0.638 0.329 0.091 2.056 
SG 2,817 0.092 0.247 -0.484 1.538 
AG 2,817 1.622 6.893 -14.873 42.660 
LIQ 2,817 1.527 1.644 0.216 11.694 
Note: a. All continuous variables are minorized at the top and bottom 1%. b. ROA= Return on assets;  
ROE=Return on assets; Tobin’s Q is a proxy, the total market capitalization divided by the total book value 
of equity at time t; Altman z-score =0.012×working capital/total assets(%)+0.014×retained earnings/total 
assets(%)+0.033×earnings before interest and tax/ total assets(%)+0.006×market value equity/total 
debt(%)+0.999×sales/total assets(%) (Altman, 1968); PRISK= Political risk; SIZE= Natural logarithm of total 
assets at time t; FIX= fixed assets at time t divided by total assets at time t; LEV= Total liabilities at time t 
divided by total assets at time t; SG= (Sales at time t minus sales at time t-1)/Sales at time t-1. AG= (Assets at 






 Table 4: Correlation matrix 
Note: * shows significance at the 0.05 level. b. ROA= Return on assets, computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at time t 
divided by total assets at time t; ROE=Return on assets, computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization at time t divided by 
total equities at time t; Tobin’s Q is a proxy, the total market capitalization divided by the total book value of equity at time t; Altman z-score 
=0.012×working capital/total assets(%)+0.014×retained earnings/total assets(%)+0.033×earnings before interest and tax/ total assets(%)+0.006×market 
value equity/total debt(%)+0.999×sales/total assets(%) (Altman, 1968); PRISK= Political risk measures are derived from textual analysis of firm-level 
conference-call transcripts centered around political issues; Unabsorbed slack= cash at time t divided by total assets at time t; Absorbed slack= the general 
and administrative expenses at time t divided the total sales at time t; SIZE= Natural logarithm of total assets at time t; FIX= fixed assets at time t divided 
by total assets at time t; LEV= Total liabilities at time t divided by total assets at time t; SG= (Sales at time t minus sales at time t-1)/Sales at time t-1. AG= 
(Assets at time t minus assets at time t-1)/assets at time t-1; LIQ=current assets at time t divided by current liability at time t. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.ROA 1.000              
2.ROE 0.654* 1.000             
3.Tobin’s Q 0.302* 0.174* 1.000            
4.Altman Z-score 0.439* 0.271* 0.546* 1.000           
5.PRISK -0.086* -0.058* -0.094* -0.109* 1.000          
6.Unabsorbed Slack -0.017 -0.016 0.283* 0.281* -0.009 1.000         
7.Absorbed Slack -0.122 -0.133 0.364* 0.116* -0.027 0.254* 1.000        
8.SIZE 0.221* 0.236* -0.053* -0.141* -0.106 -0.192* -0.516* 1.000       
9.FIX -0.038* -0.043* -0.267* -0.203* -0.012 -0.389* -0.179* 0.010 1.000      
10.LEV -0.019 -0.033 0.231* -0.415* -0.027 -0.142* 0.160* 0.229* -0.052 1.000     
11.SG 0.012 -0.011 0.141* 0.171* -0.003 0.169 -0.044 -0.009 -0.013 -0.132* 1.000    
12.AG 0.086* 0.121* 0.020 -0.022 -0.015 0.012 -0.163* 0.343* -0.002 0.025 0.137* 1.000   




Table 5: Impact of political risk on firms’ financial performance and organizational failure risk 








PRISK -0.008*** -0.005**        -0.001*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.305 0.205 0.637 0.273 
 
(0.242) (0.122) (0.559) (0.254) 
Absorbed Slack 0.375 0.282 0.533 0.224 
 
(0.248) (0.137) (0.717) (0.789) 
SIZE 0.011** -0.049*** 0.182** 0.257 
 
(0.003) (0.078) (0.086) (0.183) 
LEV -0.026** 0.118*** 0.685*** -0.862*** 
 
(0.150) (0.033) (0.188) (0.906) 
FIX -0.028* -0.119*** -0.296 -0.104 
 
(0.015) (0.049) (0.476) (0.055) 
SG 0.020** -0.021 0.814*** 0.713** 
 
(0.017) (0.049) (0.156) (0.846) 
AG 0.021 -0.006 0.006 0.02 
 
(0.021) (0.004) (0.007) (0.015) 
LIQ -0.056 0.006 0.096 0.499** 
 
(0.043) (0.004) (0.132) (0.260) 
Constant 0.238** 0.509** 3.272*** 5.978** 
 
(0.093) (0.336) (1.084) (1.974) 
Subsector dummy YES YES YES YES 
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Year dummy YES YES YES YES 
Hausman Test 63.76*** 84.36*** 36.42*** 23.07*** 
R2-within 0.176 0.1213 0.2343 0.281 
F Test 9.80*** 4.05*** 12.91*** 14.98*** 
Observations 2817 2817 2817 2817 
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Table 6: Regression analysis results: the moderating effects of unabsorbed and absorbed slacks 
Dependent Variables ROA ROA ROE ROE Tobin’s Q Tobin's Q Altman Z-score Altman Z-score 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
PRISK -0.002** -0.002** -0.007* -0.003* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.003*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.315  0.228  0.587  0.262  
 (0.353)  (0.337)  (0.423)  (0.217)  
Absorbed Slack  0.291  0.225  0.619           0.287 
  (0.247)  (0.286)  (0.423)  (0.119) 
Unabsorbed Slack× PRISK 0.0012**  0.0002  0.0004
**  0.001
***  
 (0.011)  (0.0001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Absorbed Slack× PRISK  0.0011
**  0.0003  0.0008
***  0.0012
** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Unabsorbed Slack  0.311  0.222  0.598  0.298 
  (0.358)  (0.314)  (0.207)  (0.224) 
Absorbed Slack 0.286  0.228  0.553  0.248  
 (0.248)  (0.258)  (0.474)  (0.132)  
SIZE 0.012** 0.010 0.049*** 0.044** 0.255*** 0.338** 0.254 0.229 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.090) (0.191) (0.182) (0.191) 
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LEV -0.025** -0.072** 0.119*** 0.089*** 0.648*** 0.691*** -0.761*** -0.759*** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.033) (0.075) (0.188) (0.147) (0.394) (0.419) 
FIX -0.027** -0.102*** -0.122 -0.111 -0.486*** -0.485*** -0.120 -0.119 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.045) (0.118) (0.380) (0.380) (0.040) (0.034) 
SG 0.018** 0.0530*** 0.021 0.015** 0.834*** 0.813*** 0.773** 0.769** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.050) (0.008) (0.157) (0.157) (0.838) (0.515) 
AG 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.023 0.022 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0150) (0.012) 
LIQ -0.006 -0.005 0.020 0.006** 0.054 0.060 0.453** 0.459** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.151) (0.157) (0.258) (0.132) 
Constant 0.234** 0.234** 0.507* 0.522* 3.291*** 3.274*** 5.977*** 5.981*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.349) (0.349) (1.086) (1.085) (2.290) (2.088) 
Subsector dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hausman Test 72.48*** 91.68*** 47.81*** 87.14*** 39.22*** 40.10*** 78.57*** 15.90** 
R2-within 0.171 0.171 0.119 0.122 0.232 0.233 0.316 0.316 
F Test 9.82*** 9.85*** 5.66*** 5.50*** 12.70*** 12.71*** 14.67*** 14.68*** 
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